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Soviet Law and Foreign Investment:
Perestroyka's Gordian Knot
Since the promulgation of the first decrees on joint ventures in late 1986, the
Soviet Union has produced many new laws affecting the status of foreign in-
vestment. In less than four years the legal regime has gone from an absolute ban
on any foreign ownership of the means of production to an embrace of foreign
enterprises operating in the Soviet Union. The opportunities created by the
opening of the Soviet market have excited businesses throughout the capitalist
world.
Yet both technical and conceptual problems have accompanied this radical
transformation. Although the Soviet Union seems eager to use foreign invest-
ment as a development tool, the Soviet leadership has not succeeded in creating
a legal infrastructure that will encourage outsiders. Rather, the legal enactments
send conflicting signals that generate more anxiety than reassurance. None of the
countries in Eastern Europe has produced more laws intended to encourage
capitalist investment than has the Soviet Union, yet the contemporary Soviet
legal environment presents greater uncertainty and risk for foreign investors than
any of the other formerly socialist countries. The famous knot that confronted
Alexander the Great provides an apt metaphor for the welter of laws that foreign
businesses now face.
At the heart of the Soviet effort to restructure its economic system lies a deep
paradox. The country needs a fundamental overhaul of its economic, organiza-
tional, and managerial institutions. By any measure the Soviet capacity to make
use of its labor and material resources is inadequate: labor productivity is low and
declining; the level of technology commonly employed in production compares
unfavorably with much of the developing world, and much less favorably with
the developed countries; environmental despoliation and workplace health haz-
ards are rampant; and the population's deplorably low standard of living con-
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tradicts the nation's assumed status as a superpower.1 Yet the severity and extent
of these problems has hindered the formation of a consensus about how best to
attack them.
With the passing of the old political structures, particularly the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union, new governmental institutions connected with repub-
lic and local legislatures have emerged to contest the right to grapple with the
nation's fundamental problems. Some have tried to compete with the center as a
host for foreign investment. These bodies have both enacted laws that would be
more attractive to potential investors, and obstructed implementation of the
center's decisions. The resulting "war of laws" has not produced any victors,
but rather has increased the insecurity of foreign businesses.
I. Business Forms
Until 1986 business ties between foreigners and the Soviet economy were
limited to direct sales and had to go through designated government agencies.
These restraints engendered all of the problems associated with the Soviet sys-
tem: The inability of buyers and sellers to deal directly with each other discour-
aged information flows and capital investment, and the absence of competition
produced monopoly rents for certain elements of the bureaucracy (reflected in
access to privilege and the operation of the nomenklatura patronage system)
while reducing productivity. 2 Yet socialist ideology, which insisted that private
ownership of property used for profit constituted exploitation, seemed to pre-
clude any broader involvement of foreign investors in the Soviet economy.
The promulgation of the first joint venture decree at the end of 1986 signaled
a willingness to experiment with new forms of business organization. The decree
permitted foreign entrepreneurs to take part in an enterprise's management and
to share in asset appreciation generated by a firm's activities. 3 It limited for-
1. See A. ASLUND, GORBACHEV'S STRUGGLE FOR ECONOMIC REFORM (1989); J. BERLINER, THE
INNOVATION DECISION IN SOVIET INDUSTRY (1976); Planning and Management, in THE SOVIET ECON-
OMY: TOWARD THE YEAR 2000 350 (A. Bergson & H. Levine eds. 1983); E. HEwETr, REFORMING THE
SOVIET ECONOMY: EQUALITY VERSUS EFFICIENCY (1988); Armstrong, Legal Restraints on Innovation
in the USSR, 9 REV. SOCIALIST L. 243 (1983); Goldman, The Soviet Economy and the Need for
Reform 507 ANNALS Am. ACAD. POL. & Soc. Sci. 26 (1990); Moore, Agency Costs, Technological
Change, and Soviet Central Planning, 24 J.L. & ECON. 189 (1981); Noren, The Soviet Economic
Crisis: Another Perspective, 6 Soy. ECoN. 3 (1990); Schroeder, "Crisis" in the Consumer Sector: A
Comment, 6 Soy. ECON. 56 (1990); Winiecki, Are Soviet-Type Economies Entering an Era of
Long-Term Decline? 38 Sov. STUD. 325 (1986).
2. See generally Simons, Soviet Foreign Trade: Economic, Legal and Political Aspects, in
SOVIET LAW AND ECONOMY 243 (0. loffe & M. Janis eds. 1986); Pozdniakov, The Legal Status of
All-Union Foreign Trade Organizations and Other Soviet Organizations Authorized to Conduct
Foreign Trade Transactions, 8 REv. SOCIALIST L. 169 (1982).
3. Ukaz o voprosakh, svyazannykh s sozdaniyem na territorii SSSR i deyatel'nost'yu sovmest-
nykh predprivatiy, mezhdunarodnykh ob"yedineniy i organizatsiy s uchastiyem sovetskikh i inos-
trannykh organizatsiy, firm i organov upravleniya (Decree on Questions Connected to the Formation
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eigners to minority interests in a venture, and required that both the head of the
firm's governing board and its chief executive officer be Soviet citizens. How-
ever, another decree issued at the end of 1988 loosened considerably the restric-
tions that applied to joint ventures, and in particular eliminated the cap on the
percentage of foreign ownership. 4 A presidential edict promulgated in October
1990 went even further by authorizing outright foreign ownership of firms es-
tablished in the Soviet Union.
5
Each of these measures rests on administrative rather than legislative
authority-the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers promulgated the joint venture
on the Territory of the USSR and the Operation of Joint Enterprises, International Associations and
Organizations with the Participation of Soviet and Foreign Organizations, Firms and Organs of
Management), Ved. Verkh. Sov. SSSR (1987), No. 2, Item 35; Postanovleniye ob utverzhdenii
polozheniy o khozraschenykh vneshnetorgovykh organizatsiyakh (ob"yedineniyakh) i Tipovogo
polozheniya o khozraschetnoy vneshnetorgovoy firme nauchho-proizvodstvennogo, proizvodstven-
nogo ob"yedineniya, predpriyatiya, organizatsii (Resolution on Confirming a Charter for Econom-
ically Self-sufficient Foreign Trade Organizations (Associations) and a Representative Charter for
Economically Self-sufficient Foreign Trade Firms of Scientific-production and Production Associa-
tions, Enterprises, and Organizations), SP SSSR (1987), No. 6, Item 24; Postanovleniye o poryadke
sozdaniya na territorii SSSR i deyatel'nosti sovmestnykh predpriyatiy s uchastiyem sovetskikh orga-
nizatsiy i firm kapitalisticheskikh i razvivayushchikhsya stran (Resolution on Regulating the Forma-
tion on the Territory of the USSR and the Operation of Joint Enterprises with the Participation of
Soviet Organizations and Firms from Capitalist and Developing Countries), id. No. 9, Item 40; see
Block, The Disciplining and Dismissal of Employees by Joint Ventures in the USSR, 23 GEO. WASH.
J. INT'L L. & EcON. 610 (1990); Carpenter & Smith, U.S.-Soviet Joint Ventures: A New Opening in
the East, 43 Bus. LAw. 79 (1987); Dunn, The New Soviet Joint Venture Regulations, 12 N.C.J. INT'L
L. & COM. REG. 171 (1987); Hazard, Opportunities and Problems for Joint Ventures in Soviet Law,
22 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 407 (1990); Hobdr, Joint Enterprises in the Soviet Union, 1989 Y.B.
ON SocIALIST LEGAL SYs. 173; Rogers, Jr., Glasnost and Perestroika: An Evaluation of the Gor-
bachev Revolution and Its Opportunities for the West, 16 DEN. J. INT'L & L. POL'Y 209 (1988); Note,
Soviet Joint Ventures: Providing for Appropriate Dispute Resolution, 23 CoRNELL INT'L L.J. 107
(1990); Note, The 1987 Soviet Joint Venture Law: New Possibilities for Cooperation and Growth in
East-West Relations, 17 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 581 (1989); Note, Glasnost: Joint Ventures Now
Permitted in the Soviet Union, 3 FLA. INT'L L.J. 125 (1987); Note, The New Soviet Joint Venture Law:
Analysis, Issues, and Approaches for the American Investor, 19 L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 851 (1987);
Note, International Joint Enterprises in the Soviet Union, 6 U.C.L.A. PAc. BAsIN L.J. 121 (1989);
Note, Joint Ventures in the Soviet Union: Problems Emerge, 13 U. PUGET SouND L. REV. 165 (1989);
Note, The Soviet Joint Venture Decree and Soviet Labor Law, 30 VA. J. INT'L L. 794 (1990);
Comment, Joint Venture Law in the Soviet Union: The 1920s and the 1980s, 9 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus.
633 (1989); Recent Development, Foreign Investment: New Soviet Joint Venture Law, 28 HARV. J.
Ir'L L. 473 (1987).
4. Postanovleniye o dal'neyshem razvitii vneshneekonomicheskoy deyatel'nosti gosudarstven-
nykh, kooperativnykh i inykh obshchestvennykh predpriyatiy, ob"yedineniy i organizatsiy (Resolu-
tion on the Further Development of the Foreign Economic Activity of State, Cooperative, and Other
Social Enterprises, Associations, and Organizations), SP SSSR (1989), No. 2, Item 7; cf Postanov-
leniye ob izmenenii i priznanii utrativshimi sily nekotorykh resheniy Pravitel'stva SSSR po voprosam
vneshneekonomicheskoy deyatel'nosti (Resolution on Changes in and the Obsolescence of Certain
Decisions of the Government of the USSR on Questions of Foreign Economic Activity), id., No. 23,
Item 75.
5. Ukaz ob inostrannykh investitsiyakh v SSSR (Decree on Foreign Investments in the Soviet
Union), Izvestiya, Oct. 26, 1990, at 1.
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decrees, and Gorbachev issued his edict on foreign investment under the ex-
traordinary powers granted him by the Supreme Soviet in September 1990.6
While such nonlegislative pronouncements clearly reflect the policy of the cen-
tral administrative apparatus, they lack the stature of enactments of the Supreme
Soviet. These pronouncements therefore inspire somewhat less confidence on the
part of investors who might rely on them. But in June 1990 the Supreme Soviet
passed the Law of Enterprises, which provides some additional guidance on the
rights of Soviet firms owned in whole or in part by foreign investors.7
The Law permits foreign corporate bodies and citizens to form joint enterprises
"in accordance with legislation of the U.S.S.R." 8 Like all firms covered by the
Law, foreign-owned businesses must set up a governing board consisting of
representatives of its owners and employees. The Law presumes that owners and
employees will have an equal number of seats, but allows enterprises to give its
investors greater control. The workers, however, retain at least a voice (and
perhaps a veto) with respect to an undefined range of the enterprise's business
decisions.
9
A critical issue left unsettled by the new legislation is specification of the
governmental bodies that must approve the creation of an enterprise owned
wholly or in part by foreigners. A U.S.S.R. statute enacted in early 1990 seems
to give the republics authority to charter joint ventures, but the prior Council of
Ministers decrees require the permission of the U.S.S.R. Ministries of Foreign
6. Zakon o dopolnitel'nykh merakh po stabilizatsii ekonomicheskoy i obshchestvenno-
politicheskoy zhizni strany (Law on Additional Measures for Stabilizing the Economy and the Social-
political Life of the Nation), Ved. S"yezda narodnykh deputatov SSSR i Verkh. Sov. SSSR (1990),
No. 40, Item 802.
7. Zakon opredpriyatiyakh v SSSR (Law on Enterprises in the USSR), Ved. S"yezda narodnykh
deputatov SSSR i Verkh. Sov. SSSR (1990), No. 25, Item 460; see Stephan, Perestroyka and
Property: The Law of Ownership in the Post-Socialist Soviet Union, 39 AM. J. COMe. L. (1991)
(forthcoming) [hereinafafter Perestroykal; Hanson, Property Rights in the New Phase of Reforms, 6
Sov. EcoN. 95, 104-06 (1990). A decree of the Council of Ministers issued shortly after enactment
of the Law elaborated on the rules applicable to joint stock companies. Postanovleniye ob utverzh-
denii polozheniya ob aktsionernykh obshchestvakh i obshchestvakh s ogranichennoy otvetstven-
nosti'yu i polozheniya o tsennykh bumagakh (Resolution on Confirming the Regulation on Joint Stock
Companies and Companies with Limited Liability and the Regulation on Financial Instruments), SP
SSSR (1990), No. 15, Item 82. An earlier law also was meant to promote market relations within the
state owned economy, but it did not purport to authorize private firms. See Zakon o gosudarstvennom
predpriyatii (ob"yedinenii) (Law on the State Enterprise (Association)), Ved. Verkh. Soy. SSSR
(1987), No. 26, Item 385, as amended by Zakon o vnesenii izmeneniy i dopolneniy v Zakon SSSR "0
gosudarstvennom predpriyatii (ob' 'yedinenii)" (Law on Introducing Changes in and Additions to the
USSR Law "On State Enterprises (Associations)"), Ved. S"yezda narodnykh deputatov SSSR i
Verkh. Sov. SSSR (1989), No. 9, Item 214; P. STEPHAN, SovIET ECONOMIC LAW: THm PARADOX OF
PERESTROYKA [hereinafter PARADox]; C. BECK, PAPERS IN RussIAN AND EAST EUROPEAN STUDIES, No.
805, at 36-38 (Jun. 1990).
8. Zakon o predpriyatiyakh v SSSR, supra note 7, art. 2.2; see also id. art. 4.3:
The particularities of the creation and operation of joint enterprises with the participation of Soviet
corporate bodies and foreign corporate bodies and citizens are established by legislative acts of the
USSR and the union and autonomous republics.
9. Zakon o predpriyatiyakh, supra note 7, arts. 15.1, 18.1.
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Economic Activity and of Finance. 10 The rules governing wholly owned busi-
ness are even more uncertain. The Law on Enterprises presumes that local
authorities can decide whether to register a firm, but it recognizes exceptions
based on other legislation. 1 The presidential edict authorizing direct foreign
investment does not address the question. A draft U.S.S.R. Law on Foreign
Investment, which Soviet officials contemplate submitting to the Supreme Soviet
in the spring of 1991, might resolve the matter, but at present no governmental
body possesses clear authority to grant the necessary permissions.
The problem of which level of government can regulate foreign investment
goes beyond the question of enterprise formation. The right to decide where
private firms, including those with foreign ownership, can compete with the state
sector remains hotly contested. The Law on Enterprises follows the earlier Law
on Cooperatives in allowing the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers to carve out areas
where private firms cannot go. The Council has used this authority to protect a
range of state monopolies. 12
Some of the republics have attacked these limitations as a manifestation of the
old administrative command system's continued hold on the economy. A Russian
Republic (R.S.F.S.R.) law on entrepreneurial activity, enacied in December
1990, purports to abrogate the U.S.S.R. Law on Enterprises.1 3 If effective, it
would authorize the establishment of private firms in industries such as publish-
ing, medicine, and telecommunications, where the central authorities have in-
sisted on preserving a state monopoly. This law, however, elides the fundamental
issue-whether a republic has the power to negate a law of the Union.
The taxation of private firms and foreign investors also has generated a conflict
between Union and republic laws. Decisions about an enterprise's form will
10. SeealsoZakono razgranicheniipolnomochiymezhduSoyuzomSSR isub' yektamifederatsii (Law
on the Demarcation ofthe Powers of the USSR and the Members ofthe Federation), art. 8(9), Ved. S"yezda
narodnykh deputatov i Verkh. Sov. SSSR (1990), No. 19, Item 329 (reserving for the central government
"overall management of foreign economic activity"). Compare Zakon ob osnovakh ekonomicheskikh
otnosheniy Soyuza SSSR, soyuznykh i avtonominykh respublikh (Law on the Fundamentals of Economic
Relations Between the USSR and the Union and Autonomous Republics), art. 2.2, Ved. S"yezda nar-
odnykh deputatov i Verkh. Sov. SSSR (1990), No. 16, Item 270 with Postanovleniye o myerakh gosu-
darstvennogo regulirovaniya vyneshneekonomicheskoy deyatel'nosti (Resolution on Measures for State
Regulation of Foreign Trade Activity), SP SSSR (1989), No. 16, Item 50 and Postanovleniye o dal'ney-
shem razvitii vneshneekonomicheskoy deyatel'nosti, supra note 4.
11. Zakon a predpriyatiyakh, supra note 7, art. 6.1.
12. See id. arts. 1.3, 8; Zakon o kooperatsii v SSSR (Law on Cooperatives in the USSR), Ved.
Verkh. Sov. SSSR (1988), No. 22, Item 355, amended by Zakon o vnesenii izmeneniy i dopolneniy
v Zakon SSSR "0 kooperatsii v SSSR" (Law on the Introduction of Changes in and Additions to the
USSR Law "On Cooperatives in the USSR"), Ved. S"yezda narodnykh deputatov SSSR i Verkh.
Sov. SSSR (1989), No. 19, Item 350, and id. (1990), No. 26, Item 489; Postanovleniye o reguliro-
vanii otdel'nykh vidov deyatel'nosti kooperativov v sootvetstvii s Zakonom SSSR "0 kooperatsii v
SSSR" (Resolution on the Regulation of Various Aspects of the Activity of Cooperatives in Corre-
spondence with the USSR Law "On Cooperatives in the USSR"), SP SSSR (1989), No. 4, Item 12;
Perestroyka, supra note 7, at nn. 65-67.
13. Sovetskaya Rossiya, Dec. 26, 1990, at 1.
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affect its taxation, but the choice has different consequences at the national and
republic levels. The U.S.S.R. joint venture decrees allowed tax holidays and
permitted the Ministry of Finance to negotiate preferential rates with ventures
engaged in desirable activities such as manufacturing for export; where these
preferences did not apply, a 30 percent income tax was collected, with a 20
percent withholding tax also applicable to repatriated profits. 14
By contrast, a law on enterprise taxation enacted in June 1990 imposes a 22
percent federal tax on business profits and authorizes the republics to levy an
additional tax, with the combined total not to exceed 45 percent. The law main-
tains the 30 percent rate for joint ventures where foreign ownership constitutes
more than 30 percent, but it has limited the earlier decrees' tax holidays to
enterprises with greater than 30 percent foreign investment, but only if they
engage in manufacturing (the statutory term is "material production") and do
not engage in fishing or mineral extraction. 15 Because Soviet law did not permit
wholly foreign-owned businesses at the time of the June 1990 enactment, the
enterprise tax statute does not extend the 30 percent cap to firms other than joint
ventures. The law also levies a supertax of 80 percent (increasing at specified
levels to 90 percent) on profits in excess of twice the industry norm. The enter-
prise tax law, like the joint venture decrees, imposes a 20 percent withholding tax
on profits repatriated to foreign owners, whether in the form of dividends,
interest, lease payments, or royalties.1 6 In addition, individuals who either work
for or have an interest in a Soviet firm and who reside in that country must pay
a personal income tax of up to 60 percent on payments received from the
enterprise. 17
The comparable R.S.F.S.R. law on enterprise taxation, enacted in December
1990, uses the full 45 percent rate authorized by the U.S.S.R. law, but applies
the preferential 30 percent cap only to firms wholly owned by foreign investors.
It both redefines the supertax base (principally by allowing firms to expense the
14. See authorities cited in note 3 supra; Newcity, Tax Issues in Soviet Joint Ventures, 25 TEx.
INT'L L.J. 163 (1990); Note, Soviet Taxation of United States Businesses: State of the Law and
Recommendations, 42 TAX LAW. 801 (1989). The program for transition to a market economy enacted
by the Supreme Soviet in October 1990 contemplates the creation of free enterprise zones in which
all foreign investors will enjoy favorable tax treatment, but details remain sparse. Postanovleniye ob
Osnovykh napravleniyakh stabilizatsii narodnogo khozyaystva i perekhoda k rynochnoy ekonomike
(Resolution on the Fundamental Directions of the Stabilization of the National Economy and the
Transition to a Market Economy), Ved. S"yezda narodnykh deputatov i Verkh. Sov. SSSR (1990),
No. 43, Item 889; Osnovyye napravleniya stabilizatsii narodnogo khozyaystva i perekhoda k rynoch-
noy ekonomike (Fundamental Directions of the Stabilization of the National Economy and the Tran-
sition to a Market Economy) id., No. 44, Item 906.
15. Zakon o nalogakh s predpriyatiy, ob"yedineniy i organizatsiy (Law on the Taxation of
Enterprises, Associations, and Organizations) art. 6.6, Ved. S"yezda narodnykh deputatov i Verkh.
Soy. (1990), No. 27, Item 522.
16. Id. art. 5.
17. Zakon o podokhodnom naloge s grazhdan SSSR, inostrannykh grazhdan i lits bez grazh-
danstva (Law on Income Taxation of Soviet Citizens, Foreign Citizens, and Persons Without Citi-
zenship), id., No. 19, Item 320.
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cost of intellectual property investments) and lowers its rate to 70 percent.' 8 The
R.S.F.S.R. personal income tax law distinguishes between employees and en-
trepreneurs, taxing profits received from a business at a maximum rate of 35
percent, as compared to the 50 percent tax levied on salaries. 19 Both laws purport
to supersede the Union legislation.
Execution and ratification of the contemplated United States-Soviet Union Tax
Treaty will reduce some of the tax burdens born by United States investors. The
present treaty does not limit dividend withholding, but bars any host country
taxation of royalties. 20 This treatment encourages the western investor to struc-
ture its return in the form of licensing fees rather than as dividends or interest.
The new treaty probably will reduce the discrimination against dividends by
capping host country withholding taxation at a relatively low level.
A final consideration for investors is the distinction in U.S. tax law between
subsidiary corporations and passthrough entities. A U.S. corporate parent usu-
ally can avoid immediate taxation on its investment if the Soviet-based enterprise
qualifies as a corporation under the Internal Revenue Code. 2 1 But if the type of
business activities involved threaten to bring the firm under the subpart F rules,
the investor might prefer to structure the business so that it qualifies as a part-
nership or trust.2 2 Both U.S.S.R. and republic laws appear to offer sufficient
flexibility to do either. In the case of joint ventures, for example, the decrees
provide for centralization of management and limited liability, but permit the
parties to a joint venture agreement to decide whether the enterprise will have
continuity of life and freely transferable interests. The choice as to these last
factors will determine whether the firm constitutes a corporation for U.S. income
tax purposes.23
II. Laws of Ownership
Until 1990 the Soviet Constitution cast a shadow over all foreign investment.
Reflecting Marxist theory, it recognized only two types of property: "socialist,"
which either the state or specified collective organizations could hold; and "per-
sonal," which private persons could use for consumption but not to generate
18. 0 nalogakh s predpriyatiy, ob"yedineniy i organizatsiy (On Taxation of Enterprises, Asso-
ciations, and Organizations), Ekonomika i zhizn', Jan. 1991 at 2.
19. Sovetskaya Rossiya, Dec. 23, 1990, at 2.
20. Convention on Matters of Taxation, June 20, 1973, United States-Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics, 27 U.S.T. 1, T.I.A.S. No. 8225. The Treaty applies only to Union-level taxes, which
means that the Republics remain free to tax Soviet-sourced royalties received by United States'
licensors.
21. See I.R.C. § § 881, 882, 7701 (a) (4), (5) (1982).
22. See I.R.C. § § 951-64 (1982). An investor faced with potential Subpart F problems would
prefer to structure the business in noncorporate firm if a foreign corporation, itself the subsidiary of
a United States parent, made the actual investment. The character of the income received by foreign
subsidiary would determine whether it too came under Subpart F. See id. § 954(c).
23. Morrissey v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 344 (1936); Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b) (1960).
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income. 24 Together these provisions seemed to indicate that Soviet law would not
tolerate any private ownership of the means of production.
Early in 1990, however, the Congress of Deputies and the Supreme Soviet
passed constitutional amendments and the Law on Property, which restructured
the fundamental terminology and provided a stronger legal foundation for private
ownership. 25 The category of "citizen's property" replaces "personal prop-
erty" and admits accumulation based on "lawful grounds." "Collective prop-
erty" substitutes for "socialist property" (except for the newly separated cate-
gory of "state property") and comprises, inter alia, the assets of privately owned
firms. The Law on Property provides specifically that "ownership by foreign
states, international organizations, and foreign juristic persons and citizens may
exist in the USSR.
' 2 6
Nevertheless, the 1990 changes have not eliminated all of Soviet property
law's impediments to foreign investment. The constitutional amendments left
intact article 17, which permits economic activity within the Soviet Union only
if it is "based exclusively on the individual labor of citizens and members of
their families. ' 27 The Law on Property states that "the use of any form of
property must preclude the alienation of the employee from the means of pro-
duction and the exploitation of man by man." 28 These provisions might represent
nothing more than empty sops to a dead ideology, but they also can legitimate
any subsequent move against private economic activity.
In December 1990 the Supreme Soviet enacted another law intended to en-
courage entrepreneurs. The measure, designated the Fundamentals of Legislation
on Investment Activity, creates a framework for republic laws directed at defin-
ing and protecting private capital. 29 Unlike the Law on Enterprises, this measure
explicitly recognizes the existence of direct foreign investment as well as foreign
participation in joint ventures. 30 It expresses a presumption in favor of unre-
stricted use of capital, although also carving out broad authority for governmen-
tal regulation in pursuit of "economic, scientific-technical, and social policy." 3 1
One provision authorizes lawsuits to seek compensation for governmental actions
24. See Perestroyka, supra note 7.
25. Zakon ob uchrezhdenii posta Prezidenta SSSR i vnesenii izmeneniy i dopolneniy v Konsti-
tutsiyu (Osnovnoy zakon) SSSR, (Law on the Establishment of the Post of President of the USSR and
the Introduction of Changes in and Additions to the Constitution (Fundamental Law) of the USSR),
Ved. S"yezda narodynkh deputatov SSSR i Verkh. Sov. SSSR (1990), No. 12, Item 189; Zakon o
sobstvennosti (Law on Property), id., No. 11, Item 164. See generally Hanson, supra note 7; Maggs,
Constitutional Implications of Changes in Property Rights in the USSR, 23 CoRNaELL INT'L L.J. 363
(1990); Perestroyka, supra note 7.
26. Zakon o sobstvennosti, supra note 25, art. 4.1 2.
27. Konstitutsiya (Osnovnoy zakon) (Constitution (Fundamental Law)) art. 17 (1977).
28. Zakon o sobstvennosti, supra note 25, art. 1.6.
29. Osnovy zakonodatel'stva ob investitsionnoy deyatel'nosti v SSSR (Fundamentals of Legis-
lation on Investment Activity in the USSR), Izvestiya, Dec. 16, 1990, at 2.
30. Id. art. 2.2
31. Compare id. art. 6.1 2, with id. art. 10.1.
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that infringe on investors' rights; another guarantees compensation in the event
of nationalization. 32 The measure implies that the principal means of regulating
investments will be taxation and fiscal restraints. But as long as state ownership
continues in the industries on which investments will depend-transportation,
communications, and most supplies-as a practical matter, the government will
have enormous influence over the success and failure of particular investments.
Dissatisfied with the compromises embodied in the U.S.S.R. legislation, some
republics have attempted to enact stronger guarantees for private economic ac-
tivity. The R.S.F.S.R. Law on Property, for example, contains no ideological
caveats about worker alienation. 33 It guarantees an individual's "right of own-
ership to property he has acquired on grounds that are not against the law, to things
he has created or essentially reworked, [and] to products, yields, and other income
he has obtained from use of property belonging to him." 34 The law forbids gov-
ernment regulations that discriminate against owners of private property and pro-
tects property owned by joint ventures and foreign nationals.35 As compared to
the Union law, the Russian law permits a broader scope for private interests in land,
although neither law allows individuals to enjoy an unrestricted right of trans-
ferability. 36 Finally, Russia purports to abrogate the U.S.S.R. Law on Property.
37
Both the Union and the R.S.F.S.R. plan to enact laws directed specifically at
foreign investment sometime in 1991. Negotiations with the United States over
an investment protection treaty also are nearly completed. These measures might
clarify some of the problems created by the present laws. Even if they were to
resolve the differences manifested in the legislation discussed above, however,
they probably will not address what has become the most important property
issue affecting foreign businesses, namely the matter of title to natural resources.
Given the poor quality of Soviet industrial production and infrastructure, most
large-scale projects of interest to foreigners involve some kind of natural re-
source exploitation. The Soviet Union possesses vast riches, but the decline in
central authority has put into question what branch of the state can authorize their
development. Firms stand ready to contribute capital and know-how to industries
that currently either do not exist or operate with incredible waste, but the Union,
the republics, and the various subunits (autonomous republics, autonomous re-
gions, national territories, and the like) cannot agree among themselves as to
who owns the resources to be exploited.
In the past year various legislatures have enacted laws purporting to resolve the
title question, but taken together the legislation only sharpens the conflicting
32. Id. arts. 20.2, 23.2.
33. Zakon o sobstvennosti v RSFSR, Sovetskaya Rossiya, Jan. 10, 1991, at 1.
34. Id. art. 7.1.
35. Id. arts. 3 2, 26-28.
36. Compare id. arts. 10.1, 12, with Zakon sobstvennosti, supra note 25, art. 20.
37. Postanovleniye Verkhovnogo Soveta RSFSR (Resolution of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet), art. 3,
Sovetskaya Rossiya, Jan. 10, 1991, at 1.
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claims. The Union has enacted the Fundamentals on Land Legislation, 38 the Law
on Property, 39 the Law on Demarcation of the Powers of the U.S.S.R. and the
Members of the Federation, 40 and the Law on the Fundamentals of Economic
Relations Between the U.S.S.R. and the Union and Autonomous Republics, 41 all
of which stake the central government's claim to control the exploitation of the
nation's natural resources. They allocate to republics and autonomous republics
the right to "possess, use, and dispose" of the land, but reserve for the Union
the power to establish general principles governing resource development and
foreign trade. The republics, particularly the R.S.F.S.R., have rejected this
formula and insist on their exclusive right to control their resources, subject only
to such express concessions as they might make to the Union.42 For the most part
foreign businesses have either tried to cooperate with both Union and republic
authorities, or have shied away from any commitments pending resolution of the
dispute.
HI. The U.S.-U.S.S.R. Trade Agreement
In June 1990 Presidents Bush and Gorbachev signed a bilateral trade agree-
ment that, if implemented, would overcome several barriers to foreign business
operations in the Soviet Union.43 The focus of the agreement is the grant of
most-favored-nation status to the Soviet Union, but it contains other significant
provisions. The agreement requires the Soviet Government to "make available
publicly on a timely basis all laws and regulations related to commercial activ-
ity," and to enact comprehensive measures to protect intellectual property. 4 Of
more immediate importance are articles permitting U.S. firms to pay Soviet
employees in hard currency and to maintain ruble accounts in Soviet banks.
45
Whether this agreement takes effect depends on both the Supreme Soviet and
the United States Congress. The 1988 Trade Act requires the submission of trade
agreements to Congress for approval. 46 The Jackson-Vanik Amendment to the
1974 Trade Act predicates any submission that would give the Soviet Union
most-favored-nation status on a presidential finding of substantial improvement
38. Osnovy zakonodatel'stva Soyuza SSR i soyuznykh Respublik o zemle, Ved. S"yezda narod-
nykh deputatov i Verkh. Soy. SSSR (1990), No. 10, Item 129.
39. Zakon o sobstvennosti, supra note 25.
40. Zakon o razgranichenii polnomochiy, supra note 10.
41. Zakon ob osnovakh ekonomicheskikh otnosheniy, supra note 10.
42. See Zakon o sobstvennosti v RSFSR, supra note 33, arts. 6, 20-21; Postanovleniye ob
obespecheniya ekonomicheskoy osnovy suvereniteta RSFSR (Resolution on Ensuring the Economic
Foundation of RSFSR Sovereignty), Sovetskaya Rossiya, Nov. 2, 1990, at 1.
43. Agreement on Trade Relations Between the United States of America and the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics (1990).
44. Id. arts. 6.1, 8.
45. See Stephan, The Restructuring of Soviet Commercial Law and Its Impact on International
Business Transactions, 24 GEo. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 89, 95-97 (1990).
46. 19 U.S.C. § § 2901-2903 (1988).
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in emigration practices. 47 President Bush in turn has conditioned any action on
his part on the Supreme Soviet's enactment of a law formalizing the right to
emigrate, a step President Gorbachev has promised to undertake but so far been
unable to accomplish.
The Jackson-Vanik Amendment also requires a presidential finding of im-
proved emigration as a condition of government financing of trade with the
Soviet Union. In December 1990 President Bush made the requisite finding to
permit Export-Import Bank guarantees of up to $300 million in sales to the
Soviet Union, in addition to $1 billion of Commodity Credit Corporation financ-
ing for grain sales .48 Logically, conditions that justify a Jackson-Vanik waiver for
one purpose should apply to all, but the President may find it difficult to back
down from his insistence on emigration legislation.
The underlying irony in the debate over the trade agreement is that a grant of
most-favored-nation status, whatever its symbolic value, will have almost no
immediate impact on United States-Soviet trade. The Soviet Union has insuffi-
cient hard currency reserves to buy much from the United States, and the poor
quality of Soviet marketing and production precludes it from enjoying any quick
success in penetrating the U.S. market. 49 Whatever the merits of the human
rights concerns that prompted the amendment, one can question whether the
lower tariffs that flow from most-favored status should remain the focus of the
ongoing debate over the bilateral economic relationship.
IV. The War of Laws
The larger problem in Soviet law today is the contest over the legitimacy of the
various branches of the Soviet state. The "war of laws," as the central Soviet
authorities have dubbed it, reflects deeply felt hostility between the Union and
many of the republics based on ideological and cultural conflicts as well as
powerful historical grievances. A vicious cycle has begun. The hostility grows as
the economy deteriorates, and the contest over legitimacy further aggravates the
economic situation.
The Union Supreme Soviet has attempted to state the rules of conflict. Under
the Law on Ensuring the Effectiveness of U.S.S.R. Legislation, Union laws will
47. 19 U.S.C. § 2432 (1982). Technically, the Jackson-Vanik Amendment would not apply if the
Soviet Union were to attain the status of a market economy country. Compare id. with 19 U.S.C. §
1677(18) (1982). Whatever the extent of Soviet economic reform, it seems unlikely this goal will be
achieved any time soon.
48. 7 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1910 (Dec. 19, 1990). The Stevenson Amendment, 19 U.S.C. §
2487 (1982), forbids any federal agency other than the Commodity Credit Corporation from extend-
ing trade financing in excess of $300 million. Unlike the Jackson-Vanik Amendment, this provision
cannot be waived upon a finding of improved Soviet behavior.
49. See Special Comm'n on Soviet Affairs, Ass'n of the Bar of the City of New York, Report
on Normalization of the U.S.-Soviet Trade Relationship, 46 RECORD OF Ass'N OF BAR OF Crry OF
N.Y. 104, 118 (1991).
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apply where their terms differ from republic legislation.5 ° If a republic believes
a Union law is unconstitutional, the republic may petition either the U.S.S.R.
Supreme Soviet or the Committee for Constitutional Supervision to review the
matter.5 1 The law further forbids republics from setting conditions for the ap-
plicability of Union legislation. 2 The effectiveness of these rules can be judged
by the actions of the R.S.F.S.R. Supreme Soviet, which has announced the
abrogation of Union laws on property, enterprises, enterprise taxation, and per-
sonal taxation in the period since the Union law's enactment.
Beneath the surface of the war of laws lie many traps for the unwary foreign
investor. Different levels of government may promise access and protection, but
an unwise choice of allies can backfire. The Eko-Dove scandal offers a caution-
ary tale for those who would tie the fate of their investment to particular political
careers.
The facts surrounding the affair remain exceptionally murky, but something
like the following may be true: Dove Trading International, a Johannesburg-
based firm controlled by a Briton wanted in his native country for smuggling
defense-related technology to the Soviet Union, signed a sales contract with Eko,
a Soviet cooperative connected with the association Vozrozhdeniye Uralskoy
Derevny (Resurrection of the Urals Countryside). Dove would allow Eko-
Vozrozhdeniye to pick from a list of consumer goods, which Dove would buy in
the West for hard currency. Dove would sell the goods to Eko-Vozrozhdeniye for
rubles, which Dove then would invest in various projects. The exact scope of the
deal is a matter of dispute, but when unraveled its critics in the central govern-
ment claimed that Dove had promised to provide $7.8 billion in goods and
expected roughly 140 billion rubles in return, a dollar to ruble equivalency of
roughly one-to-eighteen.
Critical to the deal, or at least to its demise, was political support derived from
the R.S.F.S.R. government, particularly a comfort letter signed by R.S.F.S.R.
deputy prime minister Gennady Filshin. Soviet authorities seized documents
relating to the contract from a Dove employee as he left the country and then
leaked their contents to conservative elements in the press. A chorus of confused
accusations followed, culminating in Filshin's resignation. The press portrayed
the transaction as a black-market currency deal, with Western investors expecting
to smuggle their profits out of the currency in the forms of diamonds, caviar,
timber, gold, and art works. U.S.S.R. Prime Minister Valentin Pavlov provided
a different, and even more sensational account: The arrangement represented a
plot by Western banks to wreck the Soviet economy by flooding it with rubles
smuggled in from abroad, with the intent of provoking a coup against Gorbachev
50. Zakon ob obespechenii deystviya zakonov i inykh aktov zakonodatel'stva Soyuza SSR, Ved.
S"yezda narodnykh deputatov i Verkh. Sov. SSSR (1990), No. 44, Item 918.
51. Id. art. 2.
52. Id. art. 3.
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and (presumably) in favor of Yeltsin. Thus Pavlov linked the scandal to his
widely unpopular decision to recall all fifty- and one-hundred ruble notes, a
move justified as an attack on the underground economy but more likely directed
at the savings of average citizens.
Many questions remain unanswered. If Dove's director had smuggled western
military technology into the Soviet Union, would it not be reasonable to suspect
that his continued presence in that country accorded with the wishes of the
central authorities, and in particular the KGB? How was the purchase of western
consumer goods to be financed, if all the rubles received for their resale were to
remain in the Soviet Union? Why would western banks want to flood the Soviet
Union with rubles, particularly in light of the energetic efforts of the central
government during the previous two years, under the direction of then Minister
of Finance Pavlov, to debase the ruble through reckless expansion of the money
supply?
However implausible the Eko-Dove scandal, it offers a few lessons to western
investors. The deal may have infuriated the central authorities precisely because
it would have given R. S.F. S. R. leaders the power to distribute coveted consumer
goods in derogation of Gorbachev's government. Under the current conditions of
scarcity, those in the center would prefer prolonging consumer hardships to
permitting other factions to harvest the political benefits that would flow from
relieving popular discomforts. In other words, whatever the economic founda-
tion of the transaction-and converting hidden ruble reserves into investment
seems far more sensible than trashing the currency by withdrawing all large
denomination notes-its political implications mattered more.
V. Conclusion
How or whether the Soviet leadership will manage to stabilize the present
economic crisis remains far from clear. The recent signs are not reassuring. At
the end of January 1991 Gorbachev issued a decree allowing the police and the
KGB to enter all business premises, including those belonging to foreigners,
unannounced to look for evidence of economic crimes. 53.Even if the implicit
threat is directed primarily against those entrepreneurs who leave the center out
of their transactions, the message remains disturbing: Economic as well as po-
litical pluralism has become a casualty of the leadership's failure to achieve
structural reform.
One could not expect the undoing of such a gigantic, and ultimately disas-
trous, experiment as was Soviet socialism without more than a few rocky mo-
ments. The pace of change has been overwhelming over the last five years, and
53. Ukaz o merakh po obespecheniyu bor'by s ekonomicheskim sabotazhem i drugimi prestu-
pleniyami v sfere ekonomiki (Decree on Measures for Maintaining the Struggle with Economic
Sabotage and Other Crimes in the Economic Sphere), Izvestiya, Jan. 28, 1991, at 1.
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the current unpleasantness may reflect nothing more than temporary panic and
anxiety. Perhaps the Union and republic authorities may yet come to an under-
standing that cooperative efforts to encourage foreign investment will produce
greater benefits for everyone. But the last year, if it has done nothing else, has
taught both the Soviet people and foreigners interested in doing business with
them that the process of converting from a command economy to a system based
on markets and property rights is extremely complex and difficult.
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